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 1  Introduction 
The analysis of the subjective concept of satisfaction has become a part of micro 
economic analysis (e.g. Freeman, 1978; Clarke, 1997, 2001; Clark and Oswald, 1996; 
Ward and Sloane, 2000). This reflects the understanding that in a world of limited 
knowledge, subjective measures can tell us something over and above what the 
objective quantities at our disposal can, such as in predicting quits (Freeman, 1978; 
Akerlof, Rose and Yellen, 1988; Clark, Georgellis and Sanfey, 1998; Clark, 2001). 
Overall job satisfaction, however, is a product of satisfaction with a number of 
different aspects of the job. In this paper, we use a structural model of job satisfaction 
and intentions to quit based on models in the job satisfaction (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 
1996; Clark, 1997, 2001; Ward and Sloane, 2000; Lydon and Chevalier, 2002) and 
labour turnover/quit behaviour (e.g. Jovanovic, 1979; Farber, 1999; Gibbons and 
Waldman, 1999) in the literature. Conventional models of intentions to quit and 
turnover behaviour (e.g. Brewer, 1996) concentrate on the pecuniary aspects of the 
current job and potential alternatives, e.g. current salary. Whilst they acknowledge the 
importance of non-pecuniary factors, the datasets used for analysis seldom contain 
information on these. If an attempt is made to model the non-pecuniary aspects of a 
job, it is done so via a limited set of job characteristics, such as total hours of work. 
Most studies of job satisfaction do not assess the implication of their results for actual 
worker behaviour, i.e. the propensity to quit. In this study we are able to combine the 
two in order to examine the influences on the various elements of job satisfaction and 
the effect of job satisfaction on intentions to quit. 
The academic labour market is one where individuals appear to earn less than 
similarly qualified individuals elsewhere (Machin and Oswald, 2000; Stevens, 2004). 
This suggests that there are elements of academic employment that compensate for 
these disparities (Rosen, 1986). Unfortunately, the literature on the job satisfaction of 
academics is limited
1. Oshagbemi (1996, 1998), investigated job satisfaction of UK 
academics, but the analysis does not go beyond cross-tabulation. More recently, Ward 
and Sloane (2000) studied the job satisfaction of academics in five Scottish higher 
                                                 
1 In an extensive review of job satisfaction, Oshagbemi (1996) found no studies published between 
1981 and 1995 relating to the job satisfaction of university staff and only seven from an earlier date. 
Only one of the latter covered more than one university. There have been, to our knowledge, only two 
studies since, Oshagbemi (1998) and Ward and Sloane (2000). 
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analysis. Our dataset allows us to consider the satisfaction of a much larger group of 
academics from ten English HEIs and its implications for intentions to quit. 
An important but often-ignored fact about self-reported satisfaction is that it is 
conditional the current job having been chosen previously on the basis of expectations 
about unknown elements of the job and then experienced. Whilst the pay and other 
financial aspects of employment (e.g. pensions) are often known with certainty before 
a contract is made, many of the non-pecuniary aspects (such as how well one will get 
on with ones colleagues) are not. Thus, the fact that many studies report high levels of 
satisfaction is no longer a mystery. People choose jobs that they wish to undertake, 
given their expectation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of the job. High levels 
of reported job-satisfaction do not necessarily mean that most jobs are inherently 
satisfactory, but rather that most people’s expectations are fulfilled; and that those for 
whom they are not are likely to shift jobs in order to find a better match. Also, if the 
nature of the job changes, such as pressure to increase the number of hours 
undertaken or how they are spent (i.e. the relative balance of the more and less 
pleasurable aspects of the job) job satisfaction will fall and the likelihood of an 
individual leaving will increase in just the same way as it would if wages were cut or 
grew at a slower than expected rate. Another type of change that might affect job 
satisfaction and/or the likelihood of an individual leaving are changes in an 
individual’s circumstances. The arrival of children may mean that staff reassess the 
balance between the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of the job. Pleasure in the 
job itself may be less important and salary more so, when there are more mouths to 
feed. 
One important point to note about studies of satisfaction is that reported levels 
of satisfaction in the economy as a whole tend to be fairly high (consider the first 
column of Table 1). Workers tend to be fairly satisfied with most aspects of their jobs. 
The levels of satisfaction reported by academic staff (Oshagbemi, 1996, 1998; Ward 
and Sloane, 2000) are generally slightly lower than those reported for the economy as 
a whole (e.g. Clark, 2001). Academic staff are most satisfied with the work itself and 
teaching in particular (Oshagbemi, 1996). However, it must be noted that such 
comparisons are tenuous, as they refer to different surveys, and in particular slightly 
  4different questions. There have been no analyses comparing the satisfaction of 
academic staff in HE with the rest of the population using the same survey
2. With this 
caveat in mind, the single area where academic staff compare well with the population 
as a whole is in the opportunity to use initiative (Ward and Sloane, 2000)
3. The 
greatest differences in satisfaction between academics and the population as a whole 
are with pay and promotions. Although these are the areas where satisfaction is the 
lowest in the economy as a whole (Clark, 2001), the difference between satisfaction 
with these two facets and the other is much larger for academics than for other 
workers. This is something that we shall investigate further in sections 3.1.1 and 4.3 
below. 
 
Table 1 Reported satisfaction in previous studies 
Whole 
economy  UK academics  Scottish 
academics 
 
Clark (2001) Oshagbemi (1996) Ward and 
Sloane (2000) 
Overall job satisfaction  5.427  4.212
† 5.04 
Work itself  5.562 
Teaching = 5.09 
Research = 4.66 
Admin = 3.93 
5.27 
Promotion 4.484  3.42  3.40 
Pay 4.615  3.44  3.60 
Hours 5.214  -  4.52 
Job security  5.192  -  4.41 
Opportunity to use initiative  5.745  -  5.81 
Supervisors 5.529  4.18  5.09 
Co-workers -  4.81  5.42 
Physical work conditions  -  4.33  - 
•  Table shows the percentage of respondents reporting a given level of satisfaction 
•  Satisfaction is coded as follows: 1 = Completely dissatisfied, 2 = Mostly dissatisfied, 3 = 
Somewhat dissatisfied, 4 = Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 5 = Somewhat satisfied, 6 = 
Mostly satisfied, 7 = Completely satisfied 
•  † This comes from Oshagbemi (1998) 
 
                                                 
2 However, note that this is consistent with the fact that satisfaction is generally found to be negatively 
correlated with education (Clark and Oswald, 1996). 
3 Note that Oshagbemi (1996) does not ask a question relating to the use of initiative. 
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We investigate the determinants of the job satisfaction of academics in section 4 and 
the factors influencing the reported likelihood of leaving UK higher education in 
section 5. In the final section we draw out the conclusions of the study. 
2  The General Model 
Our model has essentially two stages: in the first stage we consider the 
determinants of academics’ job satisfaction; the less satisfied an individual is with 
their job, the more likely they are to consider leaving academe.  
In economic terms, the utility a job provides is a product of a number of factors, 
the most obvious of which is the wage it pays, but others include the hours of work 
the job-holder must undertake, the environment he or she must work in (both in terms 
of the physical and social environment) and the longer term prospects it offers in 
terms of job-security and possibilities for promotion. 
Consider the following static utility function 
( ) z x h w u U v , , , + =
() []
  (1)        
where  U is utility relating to non-work aspects of life, w represents earnings 
(including other non-wage financial benefits, together these make up what we call the 
pecuniary benefits of a job), h represents hours worked, x represents non-pecuniary 
aspects of work, z represents personal characteristics likely to affect utility derived 
from work (such as whether the individual has a family etc). Like many studies, we 
assume that overall utility is separable in U and u(.)
4 and concentrate our analysis on 
job-related utility
5. 
An individual will quit a job j if they think there is an alternative job k such that  
( )  (2)       i j j j i k k k z x h w u q z x h w u E , , , , , , > −
                                                 
4 This is assumption is generally only implicit, with studies taking u(.) as the starting point (e.g. Clark 
and Oswald, 1996). 
5 Note that we will allow the impact of certain aspects of the job on other utility generating activities 
through u(.). 
  6where q represents the costs associated with quitting for alternative employment and 
E[.] is an expectations operator. It is possible that u can vary across individuals, e.g. 
long hours may be less attractive for people with children.. 
( ) [ ] ( ) z x h w u z x h w u E , , , , , , > i i j i j 0 0 0   (3)      
where  
This model is closely related to the worker-side of the classic turnover model of 
Jovanovic (1979), where worker-firm matches are experience goods
6. In Jovanovic 
(1979), dissatisfaction – that is, reality being worse than one’s expectation – reveals 
itself in a positive relationship between the probability of separation and firm-specific 
tenure at low levels of tenure. As the individual learns more about the job, they are 
more likely to find aspects of it fail to meet their expectations. After this learning 
period, where expectations are confronted with outcomes, the separation probability 
will decrease with tenure as those with a higher probability of leaving do so and those 
with a lower probability remain (this is also because little learning takes place and 
there is only a small probability that the expected marginal product will decline 
sufficiently to cause the worker to move to a new firm). Moreover, if there is 
heterogeneity in the rate at which individuals find out whether their expectations are 
true or not, the relationship between tenure and separations will be negative. This 
heterogeneity can be due to heterogeneity of workers themselves or due to some 
random influence on the hazard rate at which the true values of u(.) for the job are 
revealed. 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding what other jobs are available and the 
probability of actually obtaining them, we can generalise (2) to obtain 
( ) ( ) [ ] { } q z x h w u E z x h w u f P   (4)     i k k k i j j j − + − = , , , , , ,
                                                 
6 In Jovanovic (1979), the wage offered is based on the firms’ expectation of the individual’s marginal 
product. 
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the current job, a positive function of the expectation of utility outside of UK HE, and 
a negative function of the costs of quitting
7. 
As is common with studies of satisfaction, we evaluate u(wj, hj, xj, zi) using 
measured job satisfaction. When it comes to the elements of E[u(wk, hk, xk, zk)], this is 
rather more difficult. We do have a measure of what respondents expect that they 
could earn if they worked outside of academe, E[u(wk)]. Other elements and the 
effects of the costs of quitting are more difficult, and we aim to pick these up with 
other variables, such as subject dummies and variables to account for whether 
individuals have experience of work outside academe. Moreover, it is likely that 
individuals’ expression of satisfaction may not only be influenced by their current job, 
but also their expectations of alternatives. 
3  Data Description and Preliminary Analysis 
Our sample is based on a survey of academics at ten institutions of higher 
education (four old and five new universities, plus one college of higher education). 
The 2,722 respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction with ten aspects of their 
jobs on a seven-point scale like those of the studies summarised in Table 1 (from 
completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied). Their responses are summarised in 
Table 2. Our results echo those of Ward and Sloane (2000) in that we find that 
academics rate the work itself, the opportunity to use their own initiative and their 
relations with their colleagues most highly. The aspects with which they are least 
satisfied are their promotion prospects, their salary and their total earnings.  
 
                                                 
7 Note that in this report what we are interested in is the probability of leaving UK higher education 
rather than merely the probability of leaving the job. 
  8Table 2 Reported satisfaction, % 
  Level of Satisfaction   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Mean 
The  actual  work  itself  1 2 7 3 21  55  10  5.48 
Promotion prospects  15 12 18 21 15 15 4  3.69 
Salary  11 14 23 13 17 19 4  3.85 
Total earnings  9  13 22 15 16 20 4  3.95 
Relations with manager  5  7  10 12 14 36 16 4.96 
Job security  11 7  10 12 16 29 15 4.63 
Being able to use own 
initiative 
2 3 5 6 21  42  21  5.54 
The hours you work  5  8  16 12 16 30 13 4.68 
Relations with colleagues  1 2 5 7 18  49  18  5.59 
Physical work conditions  5  8  15 10 19 33 9  4.66 
•  Table shows the percentage of respondents reporting a given level of satisfaction 
•  Satisfaction is coded as follows: 1 = Completely dissatisfied, 2 = Mostly dissatisfied, 3 = 
Somewhat dissatisfied, 4 = Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 5 = Somewhat satisfied, 6 = 
Mostly satisfied, 7 = Completely satisfied 
 
3.1.1  Are Female Academics Happier? 
One common finding from analyses of satisfaction is that females tend to report 
higher levels of satisfaction than men (e.g. Clark, 1997). Ward and Sloane (2000) 
found that for Scottish academics, this was not the case. We can test the hypothesis 
that male and female academics report similar levels of satisfaction using a simple 
non-parametric test (called the ‘Mann-Whitney Test’, Wilcoxon, 1945). The 
responses to our survey support this finding for some aspects of job satisfaction but 
not others (Table 3). The aspects with which there is no significant difference in 
reported job satisfaction were what one might call the non-pecuniary aspects of the 
job: i.e. the actual work itself, being able to use their own initiative, the hours, 
relations with colleagues and the physical working conditions. In a compensating 
variation or equalising differences framework (e.g. Rosen, 1986), these are the aspects 
of academic work that one might think of as the compensating for low wages. 
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Table 3 Satisfaction by Gender 




The  actual  work  itself  5.48 5.48 5.48 0  0.593 
Promotion  prospects  3.69 3.80 3.54 -0.27  3.870
*** 
Salary  3.85 3.72 4.02 0.30  4.323
*** 
Total  earnings  3.95 3.83 4.11 0.28  4.323
*** 
Relations  with  manager  4.96 5.01 4.89 -0.12  1.766
* 
Job  security  4.63 4.69 4.55 -0.15  1.817
* 
Being able to use own initiative  5.54  5.55  5.53  -0.02  0.058 
The hours you work  4.68  4.70  4.65  -0.05  0.686 
Relations  with  colleagues  5.59 5.58 5.61 0.03  0.912 
Physical  work  conditions  4.66 4.66 4.66 0  0.106 
 
It is, however, with the pecuniary aspects of academic work that there are 
significant differences between the reported satisfaction of men and women. In 
particular, women are even less satisfied with their promotion prospects than men. 
Women are certainly less likely to be promoted than men in some areas (Booth, 
Burton and Mumford, 2000). They are, however, more satisfied with their earnings. 
One reason for this is that the inequality within academe, although present, is less than 
that elsewhere (Stevens, 2004).  
4  The Job Satisfaction of Academics 
Our model of job satisfaction is a generalisation of models such as Clark (1997), 
Ward and Sloane (2000) and Lydon and Chevalier (2002). Our model differs because 
it explicitly models the links between the influence of the characteristics of a job (i.e. 
the elements of job satisfaction) and intentions to quit the UK higher education sector.  
In our model, job satisfaction depends on a number of elements of the job, as 
outlined in Table 2. Before entering employment, individuals will form an expectation 
of what academic and alternative jobs will yield in terms of these elements and choose 
the one which offers the best set of features. Following Clark and Oswald (1996), 
Clarke, (1997, 2001), Ward and Sloane (2000) and Lydon and Chevalier (2002), we 
call the job which offers the best set of features the one that offers the highest utility. 
  10Once an individual takes up a job and experiences the true value of the elements of 
the job, they will remain in the job unless they think that there is an alternative job 
which offers a higher level of utility, once one accounts for the costs associated with 
searching for alternative employment and changing jobs.  
We have noted that our model links models of satisfaction with Jovanovic’s 
(1979) classic model of job-matching and turnover, where worker-firm matches are 
experience goods. In common with this model and its descendents, the dissatisfaction 
caused by reality being worse than one’s expectation leads to a positive relationship 
between the probability of leaving and experience at low levels of experience at early 
stages whilst the individual learns more about the job
8. 
Since dissatisfaction is caused by a dissonance between expectations and reality. 
The fact that average reports of satisfaction tend to be high can be due to the fact that 
either: (a) individuals do have some useful knowledge of what the elements of the job 
are and/or (b) those who are dissatisfied with their job tend to leave. The implication 
is that the relationship between reported satisfaction and experience will be non-
linear.  
4.1  The satisfaction of temporary staff 
We have so far assumed that individuals will be offered a job that they find 
satisfactory. However, universities are not entirely certain of the productivity of 
potential staff. This problem is particularly acute at the beginning of an academic’s 
career. Indeed, academia is one of the few sections of the labour market where there is 
a readily accessible measure of workers productivity – research output. Publications 
in peer-reviewed journals represent an instrument whereby potential employers can 
form expectations (however imperfect) of future productivity. The outcome of the 
research assessment exercise (RAE) on the academic labour market has been such that 
university departments will tend to be populated by individuals of a similar academic 
standard (particularly in terms of the RAE assessment criteria)
9. The RAE has created 
an incentive for departments to employ staff who are as good or better than the 
                                                 
8 If an individual’s expectations turn out to be correct, they will of course not quit unless a new job 
comes into being that offers higher utility (after accounting for job search and moving costs).  
9 Although this may change with the new structure of the RAE 2008. 
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staff who do not ‘make the grade’. The outcome of this state of affairs is likely to be 
university departments with similar levels of productivity
10.  
The existence of such a metric of productivity creates a problem for individuals 
with low levels of academic experience, particularly new academics. This means that 
these may have to endure jobs with lower levels of job satisfaction than more 
experienced academics with similar levels of productivity, in order to obtain academic 
credentials. This may create a dissonance between the levels of satisfaction that they 
feel they ought to be experiencing and those which the market is willing to offer. This 
is a potential explanation for the high proportion of new academics in fixed-term 
research posts, a group which suffers particular retention difficulties (Bett, 1999; 
Metcalf et al, 2005)
11. 
4.2  Satisfaction in a dynamic framework 
Thus far we have concentrated on individuals’ short-term expectations about a 
job. They will also have longer-term expectations about their career path. There are a 
number of reasons why they may have to reassess their situation: the nature and terms 
of the job may change
12, they may not receive promotion or their own circumstances 
may change. For example, young, single academics may be willing to accept research 
or teaching assistant posts with a fixed-term, because they place a lower value on their 
own time and require a lower level of consumption than those who have families. 
Indeed, early research posts may be seen as investments. These changes will affect the 
utility an individual gains from a job and thus their reported satisfaction with it and 
their propensity to search for alternative employment or quit for another post. 
Thus it can be seen that what is important for reported satisfaction is not merely 
the level of the factors influencing job satisfaction – the number of hours, the amount 
of time spent on certain aspects (research, administration etc) – but rather changes in 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, we do not have information on publications at the individual level, only departmental 
RAE scores. 
11 Another explanation for universities suffering recruitment difficulties among fixed-term research 
staff is caused by the uncertainty of re-employment. If staff value the security that tenured positions 
offer, and the possibility of a permanent post following a temporary one is uncertain, it is entirely 
rational for individuals to increase their job search intensity as they approach the end of their contract. 
12 By job here we include other roles within the university that make up the expected career path that 
begins with the initial post the individual is hired to fill.  
  12them. These changes also include the change that comes about when a job is sampled 
and an expectation is revealed.  
4.3  Analysis 
We investigate the determinants of satisfaction using ordered probits. In order to 
account for potential correlations between the equations, we estimate them as a 
system of seemingly-unrelated ordered probits (Weesie, 1999). The variables used in 
the analysis are outlined in Table 4. Explanatory variables include terms for 
experience, staff grade, permanence of contract and hours worked. Because not all 
staff undertake teaching, research and administration, we include the log of total hours 
and separate variables for hours research and administration (taking the value of zero 
where staff report that they do not spend any hours on them). We also include dummy 
variables to account for differences by subject area and university. Because only a 
little over half of our respondents report what they expect to earn if they worked 
outside higher education, we exclude this from our initial specification. We do 
however report results including this variable in our salary and total earnings 
equations in Table 6.  
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Variable Explanation 
e  Experience. Years employed in UK higher education 
e
2  Experience squared 
GProf  Grade = Professor or head of department 
GSLect  Grade = lecturer 
Non-perm  Not on permanent contract 
htotal  Log of total hours of work 
hresearch  Log of hours spent on research 
hadmin  Log of hours spent on administration 
RAE5*  Department rated 5* in last RAE exercise 
RAE5  Department rated 5 in last RAE exercise 
RAE4  Department rated 4 in last RAE exercise 
w  log of annual earnings 
w*  log of annual earnings would expect to earn if worked 
outside academia 
Non-white  Non-white ethnic group 
Female  Female 
Children  Has children 
Female×Children  Female interacted with Children 
Num children  Number of children 
Female×Num children  Female interacted with Num children 
Married  Married 
Female×Married  Female interacted with Married 
University dummies (baseline = old southern university 2) 
Old Sth uni 1  Old southern university 1 
New Sth uni 1  New southern university 1 
New Lon uni  New London university 
New Sth uni 2  New southern university 2 
Old Lon uni  Old London university 
New Nth uni  New northern university 
New Sth uni 3  New southern university 3 
Old Nth uni  Old northern university 
New Nth uni 2  New northern university 2 
Subject area dummies (baseline = Subjects allied to medicine) 
 
The results of our estimation on the full sample are set out in Table 5 (those for 
the reduced sample are presented in Table 6). At the bottom of the table are the Log-
pseudo likelihood, the likelihood ratio χ
2 test of joint significance of the coefficients 
and an R
2 goodness-of-fit measure due to McKelvey and Zaviona (1975) for the 
independent equations to give us an indication of the fit of the model to the data
13. 
                                                 
13 Note that the methodology used to estimate the satisfaction ordered probits as a system involves first 
estimating the individual models separately and then using the variance covariance matrices to 
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them are in the range one would expect for this type of ordered categorical data. The 
likelihood ratio test that the regressions are informative, the joint test of significance 
of the coefficients of each equation, is accepted at the 1% level for all equations. 
First of all, we can see that our results support the earlier result that there are no 
significant differences between the satisfaction men and women with many of the 
elements of the academic employment. It is only with respect to their salary and total 
earnings that women report significantly different levels of satisfaction. In both cases, 
women report higher levels of satisfaction (this is not the case when we reduce the 
sample to those who report what they feel they could earn outside of academia (Table 
6) although married women are significantly more satisfied with their salary and total 
earnings in this case). Members of non-white ethnic minorities are less satisfied with 
the opportunity they have to use their own initiative, the hours they have to work and 
their relations with their colleagues than their white colleagues are. This may indicate 
one of two things – either non-white staff have higher expectations than white staff 
over these dimensions of the job or they find themselves in jobs where these 
dimensions are less satisfactory. It seems unlikely that the former is the case, and 
therefore suggests that they are finding themselves in less satisfactory jobs
14. There is 
some evidence also that they are less satisfied with their salary and total earnings, 
although only the latter is statistically significant, and then only at the 10% level. The 
dissatisfaction with total earnings becomes stronger (and more significant from a 
statistical standpoint) when we confine our sample to those who report what they feel 
they could earn outside of the higher education sector. The fact that nonwhites feel 
less dissatisfied with their salary than they are with their total earnings suggests that 
there may be greater wage equality within higher education than there is in the areas 
where academics work to supplement their salary. 
As we would expect, given our discussion above, the relationship between 
experience and job-satisfaction (where it is statistically significant) is non-linear. 
Satisfaction with the non-pecuniary aspects of the job tends to decrease with 
                                                                                                                                            
calculate robust standard errors. The goodness of fit measures are calculated based on the independent 
estimates and so are likely to under report the fit of the more efficient final system of equations. 
14 Our supposition is based on the lack of evidence that ethnic minority employees have higher 
expectations in these areas and that disadvantage in employment is common for ethnic minorities. 
  15experience for the first half of academics careers but then increases. Whether this can 
be seen as a pure learning effect as noted above is unclear, as the results imply that it 
can take ten or twenty years to learn whether one likes the job or not. In a cross-
sectional study such as ours, it is difficult to distinguish between true experience and 
other age-related effects, which may have a part to play in explaining job-satisfaction 
among English academic staff.  
Two elements where experience does not have a significant effect are 
satisfaction with salary and total earnings. This is as we would expect, as the wage 
structures in UK HEIs are highly structured and pay scales can be seen by job 
applicants before they apply for and accept job offers. The one influence on earnings 
that the individual can predict less well is promotions and the coefficients are 
significant and of the expected sign; the non-linear relationship of satisfaction 
decreasing over the early career and then increasing is supported by the data. 
Professors and, to a lesser extent, senior lecturers are generally happier in their 
jobs than lower grades – particularly, and unsurprisingly, with promotions. Professors 
tend on the whole to be more satisfied with their jobs than senior lecturers. In 
particular, professors are significantly more satisfied with their salary and total 
earnings whereas senior lecturers are not significantly different to lower grade staff. 
One explanation for this result is that if all staff have similar levels of ability, but that 
jobs are rationed so that only a lucky few get promoted, then those that do not get 
promoted will exhibit higher levels of dissatisfaction. Another extreme case is where 
the ability of staff varies and those that are promoted are the ones of the highest 
ability. In this case, if lower ability staff feel they are of the same ability as those who 
are promoted (or higher), they are will exhibit higher levels of dissatisfaction. The 
truth may lie somewhere between these two extremes. One area where senior lecturers 
are significantly more satisfied than professors and lower grades is with their physical 
work conditions. It may be the case that senior lecturers receive better offices etc than 
lower grades and are thus more satisfied than lower grades, but that professors do not 
receive an additional one and compare themselves with senior lecturers when 
considering their satisfaction. 
We suggested in the introduction that staff on non-permanent contracts are 
likely to be less satisfied with elements of their job than other staff because temporary 
  16jobs reflect an investment at the beginning of an academic career, rather than a career 
job in itself. Our results show that staff on non-permanent contracts are significantly 
less satisfied with their promotion prospects and their job security. They appear to be 
more satisfied with the actual work itself than permanent staff, although this result is 
only statistically significant at the 10% level. It is interesting to note that they are 
more satisfied with their earnings than permanent staff. This is consistent with the 
idea that they are willing to sacrifice earnings for other aspects of the job at this early 
stage of their career.
15 
There are few clear patterns in the variation in satisfaction across subject areas. 
Academic staff working in medicine and dentistry, biological and physical sciences 
are more dissatisfied with their job security than those working in other areas, 
although those in physical sciences appear to be more satisfied with their salary and 
other earnings.  
                                                 
15 Note that staff on non-permanent contracts are, on average, ten years younger than permanent staff. 
  17Table 5 Results – satisfaction 
  Actual work 
itself 
Promotion 











-0.112      -0.128 0.240
*** 0.205
** -0.067  0.008  0.087  0.021 0.090  0.058  Female 
(0.086)                    (0.083) (0.088) (0.088) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.085) (0.082)
-0.103                    0.019 -0.056 -0.063 0.070 -0.028 0.038 0.007 0.106 0.049 Children 
(0.103)                    (0.099) (0.105) (0.106) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.101) (0.098)
0.226                    -0.178 -0.258 -0.239 -0.196 -0.060 0.105 0.060 -0.133 -0.028 Female× Children 
(0.161)                    (0.154) (0.164) (0.164) (0.154) (0.156) (0.156) (0.154) (0.158) (0.154)
0.058                    -0.044 0.006 0.028 0.003 0.018 0.014 0.027 0.022 -0.002 Num children 
(0.038)                    (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036)
-0.035                    0.083 0.049 0.039 0.042 0.002 -0.076 -0.015 0.002 0.008 Female× 
Num children  (0.065)                    (0.062) (0.066) (0.066) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062)
-0.049                    -0.019 0.007 -0.031 -0.096 -0.078 -0.010 0.138
* 0.006 0.084 Married 
(0.073)                    (0.071) (0.075) (0.075) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.070)
0.074                    0.065 0.110 0.147 0.105 0.193
* 0.011 -0.176
* -0.014 -0.060 Female× Married 
(0.105)                    (0.101) (0.107) (0.108) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.101)
-0.024                    -0.038 -0.102 -0.161
* -0.014 0.034 -0.267
*** -0.154
* -0.270
*** -0.069 Non-white 
(0.083)                (0.081) (0.085) (0.085) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081)  (0.081) (0.082)  (0.080)
-0.019
**                -0.058





***  e 
(0.008)            (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) 
0.001
**                  0.001







(0.000)                    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.183






*** 0.086 0.071 -0.029 GProf 
(0.080)                    (0.078) (0.090) (0.090) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076) (0.078) (0.076)
-0.069                  0.272
*** 0.084 0.069 0.076 0.169
*** 0.036 -0.107
* -0.092 -0.186
***  GSLect 
(0.063)                  (0.061) (0.066) (0.066) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) 
0.116




*** -0.068 0.055 -0.079 -0.096 Non-perm 
(0.063)                  (0.061) (0.068) (0.068) (0.061) (0.065) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061)
  18  Actual work 
itself 
Promotion 




















*  htotal 
(0.060)            (0.060) (0.080)  (0.078)  (0.061)  (0.060) (0.059) (0.079) (0.059) (0.058)
0.069
***                  0.035 -0.054
** -0.058
** 0.018 -0.015 0.067
*** 0.136
*** -0.001 0.018  hresearch 
(0.023)                    (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
-0.135







***  hadmin 
(0.028)          (0.027) (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)  (0.028) (0.027)  (0.027) 
0.253




* 0.088 0.011 -0.002 RAE5* 
(0.081)                    (0.077) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.077)
0.168
**                    0.073 -0.177
** -0.141
** 0.047 0.091 0.039 -0.061 -0.071 -0.073 RAE5 
(0.070)                    (0.067) (0.071) (0.071) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.067)
0.062                  0.031 -0.053 -0.015 -0.083 -0.144
** -0.008 0.007 -0.169
** -0.256
***  RAE4 
(0.072)                  (0.069) (0.073) (0.073) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) 
-0.001                    0.003 0.911
*** 0.795
*** 0.005 0.010
* 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.002 w 
(0.006)                    (0.006) (0.108) (0.108) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.033                    -0.099 -0.132 -0.149 -0.128 -0.269
** 0.010 0.075 -0.095 0.050 Medicine and 
dentistry  (0.115)                    (0.110) (0.118) (0.120) (0.110) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.113) (0.109)
-0.132                    -0.151
* 0.008 -0.029 -0.167
* -0.348
*** -0.050 -0.091 -0.093 -0.093 Biological 
sciences  (0.093)                    (0.089) (0.094) (0.094) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.091) (0.088)
0.273                -0.100 -0.238 -0.314 0.085 0.096 0.208 -0.230  -0.048 -0.423
**  Agriculture and 
related subjects  (0.212)                    (0.205) (0.210) (0.211) (0.204) (0.209) (0.210) (0.203) (0.210) (0.200)
0.136                    -0.076 0.245
** 0.242
** 0.001 -0.288
*** 0.130 0.083 0.065 -0.057 Physical sciences 
(0.101)                    (0.096) (0.102) (0.103) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.099) (0.096)
0.125                    0.233
* 0.134 0.114 0.111 0.057 0.253
* 0.201 0.005 0.212 Mathematical 
sciences  (0.135)                    (0.129) (0.136) (0.136) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.131) (0.133) (0.129)
0.064                  -0.055 0.191
* 0.215
* 0.117 0.030 0.059 -0.062 -0.200
* 0.388
***  Computing 
sciences  (0.114)                    (0.109) (0.115) (0.115) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.110)
-0.131                    -0.062 0.079 0.033 -0.050 -0.068 -0.045 -0.179
* -0.073 0.048 Engineering 
(0.111)                    (0.108) (0.114) (0.114) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.110) (0.107)
  19  Actual work 
itself 
Promotion 











0.505        -0.055  0.192 0.234  0.343  0.091 0.276  0.104 0.043 0.045  Other technology 
(0.362)                    (0.333) (0.349) (0.350) (0.341) (0.339) (0.342) (0.334) (0.344) (0.328)
-0.453
**                    -0.551
*** -0.179 -0.112 -0.220 -0.249 -0.213 -0.340
* -0.395
** -0.267 Architecture and 
planning  (0.192)                  (0.190) (0.196) (0.201) (0.186) (0.189) (0.188) (0.188) (0.190) (0.185)
-0.047                    0.104 0.118 0.120 -0.110 -0.066 -0.091 -0.102 -0.221
*** -0.091 Social studies 
(0.084)                  (0.081) (0.087) (0.088) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.083)  (0.081)
-0.039                    -0.213
** -0.140 -0.093 -0.035 0.139 -0.077 -0.074 -0.243
** 0.167 Business and 
admin. studies  (0.108)                    (0.104) (0.111) (0.111) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) (0.104)
0.159                    0.234 0.223 0.072 0.660
* 0.391 0.152 0.144 -0.387 -0.073 Librarianship & 
info. science  (0.372)                    (0.347) (0.383) (0.383) (0.363) (0.362) (0.358) (0.347) (0.359) (0.349)
0.076                    -0.038 0.187 0.108 -0.208 -0.271
* -0.175 -0.293
* -0.005 -0.210 English lit. And 
classics  (0.168)                    (0.160) (0.164) (0.166) (0.160) (0.163) (0.163) (0.160) (0.165) (0.159)
0.288
**                  0.183 0.021 -0.057 0.002 0.036 0.101 0.224 0.243
* 0.521
***  Modern 
languages  (0.147)                    (0.142) (0.156) (0.156) (0.143) (0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.146) (0.142)
0.046                    0.139 0.141 0.132 0.011 -0.142 -0.123 -0.160
* -0.196
** -0.134 Other humanities 
(0.101)                    (0.096) (0.104) (0.104) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.099) (0.096)
-0.284
*                  -0.290





*  Art and design 
(0.159)                    (0.157) (0.174) (0.174) (0.155) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.159) (0.156)
0.265
***                    0.064 0.029 0.048 0.149 0.164
* 0.170
* -0.048 0.033 0.105 Education 
(0.099)                    (0.094) (0.101) (0.102) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.094) (0.097) (0.094)
0.037                    -0.078 0.055 0.105 -0.056 -0.148 0.199 0.125 0.181 0.039 Combined studies 
(0.124)                    (0.118) (0.124) (0.124) (0.119) (0.120) (0.122) (0.119) (0.123) (0.119)





*** 0.146 -0.088 0.116 Old Sth uni 1 
(0.101)                  (0.096) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.098) (0.096)
0.322






** 0.147 0.109 -0.174 New Sth uni 1 
(0.124)                    (0.119) (0.127) (0.127) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.119) (0.122) (0.118)
0.065                  -0.162
* -0.061 -0.034 0.005 -0.345
*** -0.088 0.095 0.008 -0.888
***  New Lon uni 
(0.101)                  (0.098) (0.105) (0.105) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.100) (0.098) 
  20  Actual work 
itself 
Promotion 












**        0.091  -0.010 0.016  0.062 0.031 0.025 -0.052 0.157
* -0.163
*  New Sth uni 2 
(0.094)                    (0.091) (0.097) (0.097) (0.090) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.093) (0.090)





** 0.101 -0.060 Old Lon uni 
(0.079)                (0.075) (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075)
0.198                  -0.083 0.089 0.026 0.213
* -0.589
*** 0.004 0.031 0.104 -0.607
***  New Nth uni 
(0.128)                  (0.122) (0.136) (0.136) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) (0.122) 
0.157
*                    -0.051 -0.162
* -0.169
* 0.230
** -0.000 0.089 0.039 0.308
*** -0.133 New Sth uni 3 
(0.094)                    (0.090) (0.098) (0.098) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.093) (0.090)
-0.057                    -0.046 -0.032 -0.070 0.215
*** 0.239
*** 0.077 0.067 0.059 -0.062 Old Nth uni 
(0.066)                    (0.064) (0.067) (0.068) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063)
0.044                  -0.096 0.077 0.111 -0.186 -0.519
*** -0.147 0.245
** -0.103 -0.421
***  New Nth uni 2 
(0.128)                  (0.123) (0.135) (0.135) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.126) (0.123) 
-2.346









***  τ1 
(0.242)          (0.232) (1.033) (1.033) (0.234)  (0.233) (0.235)  (0.295) (0.241)  (0.227) 
-1.733









***  τ2 
(0.232)          (0.231) (1.033) (1.033) (0.232)  (0.231) (0.230)  (0.292) (0.232)  (0.225) 
-1.142









***  τ3 
(0.230)          (0.230) (1.034) (1.034) (0.231)  (0.230) (0.228)  (0.290) (0.230)  (0.224) 
-0.974









***  τ4 
(0.229)          (0.229) (1.035) (1.035) (0.231)  (0.230) (0.227)  (0.289) (0.228)  (0.224) 








**  τ5 
(0.229)              (0.229) (1.036) (1.035) (0.230)  (0.229) (0.226)  (0.288) (0.227)  (0.223)
1.509
***                0.628
*** 9.142
*** 8.105
*** 0.097 0.162 0.375
* -2.104
*** 0.267 0.637
***  τ6 
(0.230)                    (0.231) (1.039) (1.038) (0.230) (0.229) (0.226) (0.286) (0.227) (0.224)
Observations                      2,706 2,662 2,361 2,339 2,692 2,695 2,705 2,690 2,706 2,698
LPL -3,464.2  -4,763.7  -4,257.9  -4,235.1  -4,630.7  -4,432.4  -3,997.9  -4,567.0  -3,774.3  -4,668.2 
χ
2  215.6











2                    0.087 0.160 0.106 0.099 0.073 0.354 0.073 0.236  0.060 0.102
•  Robust standard errors in parentheses,   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  21Levels of satisfaction with many of the job dimensions among staff at university 
2 (one of the southern new universities) appear to be higher than those at the other 
universities (recall that the baseline is one of the highly-rated southern old 
universities). There seems no reason to believe this was merely a locational effect, as, 
whilst the location might be thought to be good, other case study universities were in 
good locations. It, therefore, was likely to be a function of the university. In the 
qualitative research, the main difference between this university and the other case 
study universities was that many respondents praised the ethos of the university and 
its treatment of staff, describing it as caring, respectful of individuals and flexible 
over individual needs. It is this, perhaps, that led to greater satisfaction amongst its 
staff. The universities where satisfaction with salary is lower are located in the south 
of England where living costs are higher. However, this dissatisfaction is not present 
at all of the southern and London universities. Indeed the satisfaction at the first of the 
highly-rated southern old universities (and the London one) is significantly higher 
than the other. 
There is a negative relationship between total hours worked and satisfaction 
with all elements except the actual work itself. This reflects the general premise that 
people generally prefer fewer hours of work than more. However, for those who do it, 
hours spent on research have a positive effect on satisfaction with the actual work 
itself, the ability to use one’s own initiate and with hours generally. Note that this is 
the effect of an hour of research, leaving the total number of hours worked 
unchanged. The net affect of an additional  hour of research on satisfaction (i.e. 
accounting for both the coefficient on htotal and hresearch) is only positive with respect to 
the actual work itself. Hours of work spent on administration has a negative effect on 
satisfaction with all dimensions of academics’ job satisfaction, with the exception of 
their promotion prospects and relations with their manager. It may be the case that the 
positive benefits of administration with respect to these two factors offset the negative 
effects on general satisfaction. Alternatively, it may just be the case that there no 
significant relationship between the amount of time spent on admin and satisfaction 
with promotion prospects and relations with one’s manager. 
The fact that the negative effect of hours spent on research and administration 
are greater than extra hours generally, suggests that staff who put in extra effort in 
  22these tasks do not feel that they are adequately rewarded. The fact that the more time 
staff spend on research the more satisfied they are with the actual work itself is 
consistent with the idea that research is a non-pecuniary benefit of academic work. 
That is, research is one of the factors that offsets the low salaries in academic relative 
to alternative employment. Conversely, hours spent on administration appear to 
reduce satisfaction almost across the board. 
Staff in five star departments tend to enjoy the work itself more than other staff 
(as, to a lesser extent, do staff at five-rated departments) and tend to be more satisfied 
with their promotion prospects, their relations with their manager and their ability to 
use their own initiative. This is consistent with the idea that staff wish to work at 
institutions of academic excellence, and the stability that the recognition of this 
excellence imparts is also appreciated by staff. Staff at five star departments are, 
however, less satisfied with their salary (although not their total earnings). This may 
reflect the fact that the national pay scales in academia constrain institutions ability to 
reward the most productive workers. This conclusion is supported by the results 
reported in Table 6, where the inclusion of a measure of individual staff’s own 
assessment of their abilities – the wage they would expect to command outside of 
academia – is included. In this case, the negative effect of RAE5* on satisfaction with 
salary and total earnings disappears. 
Earnings are not significantly correlated with satisfaction with any of the non-
pecuniary aspects of the job. This suggests that staff are able to consider the pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary aspects of their job independently. This cannot, however, tell us 
whether lower wages are traded off with other aspects of the job, because there is not 
enough within-academia variation in these factors. In order to answer this question, 
one would have to have a sample that included responses for people in non-academic 
jobs. 
Apart from the effect of being in a five-star department noted above, the 
inclusion of the expected outside wage has little effect on the coefficients in the 
results for satisfaction with salary and total earnings except for that on current wages 
and experience. The constraint that the coefficients on w and w* are equal and 
opposite is rejected at the 1% level for both equations. We can, therefore, reject 
hypothesis that it is only relative earnings that count for satisfaction with earnings. 
  23The lack of a significant effect of experience in these specifications may reflect the 
fact that individual’s perception of their own worth outside UK academia diverge 
from their actual salaries over their career. 
 
Table 6 Including alternative salary 
 Salary  Total  earnings 
0.085 0.054  Female 
(0.105) (0.105) 
0.018 -0.009  Children 
(0.129) (0.129) 
-0.286 -0.253  Female×Children 
(0.214) (0.214) 
0.022 0.040  Num children 
(0.050) (0.050) 
0.045 0.028  Female× 
Num children  (0.092) (0.092) 
-0.106 -0.132  Married 
(0.088) (0.088) 
0.328** 0.352***  Female×Married 
(0.128) (0.128) 
-0.138 -0.210**  Non-white 
(0.102) (0.102) 
-0.014 -0.001  e 
(0.011) (0.011) 
-0.000 -0.000  e
2 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.509*** 0.536***  GProf 
(0.117) (0.117) 
0.115 0.084  GSLect 
(0.081) (0.081) 
0.294*** 0.263***  Non-perm 
(0.082) (0.082) 
-0.587*** -0.504***  htotal 
(0.100) (0.095) 
-0.043 -0.044  hresearch 
(0.030) (0.030) 
-0.085** -0.091**  hadmin 
(0.036) (0.036) 
-0.012 0.038  RAE5* 
(0.097) (0.097) 
-0.025 -0.003  RAE5 
(0.088) (0.089) 
0.083 0.120  RAE4 
(0.089) (0.089) 
1.758*** 1.474***  w 
(0.152) (0.149) 
-0.992*** -0.868***  w* 
(0.089) (0.089) 
-0.192 -0.190  Medicine and dentistry 
(0.145) (0.147) 
-0.069 -0.101  Biological sciences 
(0.113) (0.113) 
  24 Salary  Total  earnings 
-0.113 -0.239  Agriculture and related 
subjects  (0.236) (0.237) 
0.325*** 0.316***  Physical sciences 
(0.122) (0.122) 
0.216 0.241  Mathematical 
sciences  (0.168) (0.168) 
0.244* 0.293**  Computing sciences 
(0.134) (0.134) 
0.058 0.023  Engineering 
(0.131) (0.131) 
0.611 0.708*  Other technology 
(0.413) (0.414) 
-0.416* -0.341  Architecture and 
planning  (0.239) (0.247) 
0.204* 0.168  Social studies 
(0.107) (0.107) 
-0.026 0.015  Business and admin. 
studies  (0.132) (0.132) 
0.229 0.022  Librarianship & info. 
science  (0.511) (0.510) 
0.006 -0.066  English lit. And 
classics  (0.210) (0.210) 
-0.108 -0.154  Modern languages 
(0.211) (0.211) 
0.145 0.164  Other humanities 
(0.134) (0.134) 
-0.053 -0.161  Art and design 
(0.215) (0.216) 
-0.171 -0.113  Education 
(0.129) (0.129) 
-0.088 0.004  Combined studies 
(0.155) (0.154) 
-0.166 -0.114  Old Sth uni 1 
(0.117) (0.117) 
0.338** 0.284*  New Sth uni 1 
(0.161) (0.161) 
0.028 0.034  New Lon uni 
(0.132) (0.132) 
0.116 0.144  New Sth uni 2 
(0.118) (0.118) 
-0.119 -0.080  Old Lon uni 
(0.095) (0.095) 
0.061 0.017  New Nth uni 
(0.175) (0.175) 
-0.126 -0.127  New Sth uni 3 
(0.121) (0.122) 
0.015 -0.017  Old Nth uni 
(0.080) (0.080) 
0.300* 0.355**  New Nth uni 2 
(0.163) (0.163) 
3.964*** 2.601*  τ1 
(1.450) (1.445) 
4.616*** 3.269**  τ2 
(1.451) (1.445) 
5.296*** 3.956***  τ3 
(1.452) (1.446) 
  25 Salary  Total  earnings 
5.654*** 4.363***  τ4 
(1.452) (1.446) 
6.208*** 4.899***   τ5 
(1.453) (1.447) 
7.309*** 5.952***  τ6 
(1.455) (1.448) 
Observations 1,621  1,610 
LPL -2,839.295  -2,847.043 
χ
2  326.64*** 279.23*** 
M&Z R
2 0.204  0.175 
•  Standard errors in parentheses 
•  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
4.4  Is there a single overall measure of satisfaction? 
Many studies utilise a single measure for overall job satisfaction, with the 
assumption (either implicit or explicit) that the factors mentioned above are 
intermediate determinants. This can be done by extracting the first principal 
component of reported satisfaction with these elements. Beyond the statistical 
objection to performing factor analysis on categorical variables, our discussion above 
suggests that this may be an overly simplistic view of job satisfaction and that there 
may be a number of separate and possibly orthogonal elements that need to be 
considered. A more appropriate methodology is to perform a factor analysis on the 
predicted values of latent variables assumed to underlie these categorical reported 
measures of satisfaction and examine how much of the total variation in satisfaction 
with these ten elements can be explained by the extracted factors
16.  
Because of the reduction in sample size imposed by the inclusion of w* in our 
analysis, we restrict our analysis here to the predicted values obtained from the 
analysis outlined in Table 5. The results of performing principal-components factor 
analysis on our predicted values of the ten elements of job satisfaction are reported in 
Table7. This table reports the factor loadings, along with the eigenvalues and the 
proportion explained by the factors extracted with eigenvalues of more than one
17.  
 
                                                 
16 For more on factor analysis, see for example Harman (1976). 
17 The so called ‘Kaiser-Guttman rule’ after Guttman (1954) and Kaiser (1970). 
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Element of satisfaction  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3 
The actual work itself  0.815  -0.044 -0.201 
Promotion prospects  0.431  0.120  0.800 
Salary 0.011  0.986  -0.167 
Total earnings  0.015  0.986  -0.161 
Relations with manager  0.874  0.051 0.139 
Job security  -0.045  0.181  0.917 
Being able to use own initiative  0.892  0.037 0.107 
The hours you work  0.801  -0.124 -0.336 
Relations with colleagues  0.736  -0.014 -0.066 
Physical work conditions  0.751  0.000 -0.045 
Eigenvalue  4.158 2.013 1.724 
Proportion explained  0.416 0.201 0.172 
Cumulative proportion explained  0.416 0.617 0.790 
 
There are three factors with eigenvalues of more than one and together these 
explain 79 per cent of the variation in the ten latent satisfaction variables
18. The first 
factor explains just over half of the common variance of the predicted satisfaction 
variables. The factor loadings suggest that this factor explains much of the variation 
of six of the factors: respondents’ relations with their manager, being able to use their 
own initiative, the hours they work, relations with colleagues and physical work 
conditions
19. We label this factor ‘satisfaction with non-pecuniary elements of the 
current job’. The second factor merely reiterates what we saw in the analysis above, 
namely that the explanation for both salary and total earnings are highly correlated. 
Moreover, the analysis on the whole sample suggests that the pecuniary factors are 
quite separate from the non-pecuniary ones. The final factor in the analysis of the 
whole sample includes satisfaction with promotion prospects and job security. We call 
this factor ‘longer term prospects’.
20 
These results suggest that there are in fact three separate sets of factors which 
determine the job satisfaction of academics. The most important from the viewpoint 
                                                 
18 In what follows, we will refer to the ten predicted latent satisfaction variables as ‘predicted 
satisfaction variables’ for brevity. 
19 It also explains some of the satisfaction with promotion prospects. 
20 Note that promotion prospects also enter into the principal ‘non-pecuniary’ factor, although with a 
lower factor loading than the other non-pecuniary factors. 
  27of most economists, namely earnings, is distinct from the other dimensions of the job. 
Satisfaction with their longer term prospects explains almost as much of the total 
variation. The majority of the variation in six of the job dimensions is explained by a 
single common factor, which we call ‘satisfaction with non-pecuniary elements of the 
current job’. It is important to note that these proportions of variance explained are 
not the same as weights – they do not rank the relative importance of these factors. 
However, the influence of these factors on the likelihood of leaving can be assessed 
and this is explored in the next section. 
5  Factors affecting the likelihood of leaving Higher Education 
5.1  Introduction 
In this section we examine the influence of reported satisfaction, wage 
differentials, experience and other characteristics on the likelihood of leaving UK 
higher education of academics. Our survey asked how likely staff thought it was that 
they would leave UK higher education
21. Their responses are summarised in Table 8.  
 
Table 8 Likelihood of moving to another UK university in the next year (%) 
How likely will move to another UK university in next year  Total 
Definitely 2 
Very likely or definitely  5 
Quite likely, very likely or definitely  15 
Neither likely nor unlikely  16 
Quite unlikely, very unlikely or definitely not  68 
Very unlikely or definitely not  46 
Definitely not  17 
No answer  2 
 100 
n   2,788 
•  Source: NIESR/DfES Staff Survey, 2004 
                                                 
21 Due to concern about the reliability of responses to a question on the likelihood of leaving, 
respondents were also asked to describe their job search activities. The relationship between responses 
to these questions and to the likelihood of leaving was tested and the likelihood of leaving reflected job 
search activity. However, analysis similar to that which follows was conducted using job search 
activities as the dependent variable. The results were similar (in the same direction) to those using the 
likelihood of leaving variable, but tended to be insignificant. Therefore, we report the analysis using 
the likelihood of leaving only.  
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We will investigate the influence of job satisfaction and a number of other 
elements on this likelihood leaving by means of ordered probits, as used in the 
analysis above. The variables included in the analysis are set out in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 Variables used in analysis of likelihood of leaving 
Variable Description 
w  log of annual earnings 
w*  log of annual earnings would expect to earn if worked outside 
academia 
No w*  Individual does not report w* 
S1  First factor of satisfaction (non-pecuniary elements) 
S2  Second factor of satisfaction (pecuniary elements) 
S3  Third factor of satisfaction (longer term prospects) 
Age 55+  Aged 55 years or over 
Non-white  Non-white ethnic group 
Female  Female 
Married  Married 
Female×married  Female interacted with married 
Children  Has children aged 16 or under 
Female× Children  Female interacted with Children 
Num children  Number of children aged 16 or under 
Female× 
Num children  Female interacted with children 
EU Pass  Holds non-UK EU or EEA passport 
OZNZ  Holds Australian or New Zealand passport 
USA  Holds US passport 
Foreign  Holds other foreign passport 
HQ UG  Highest qualification = UG degree 
HQ Masters T  Highest qualification = Taught masters 
HQ Masters R  Highest qualification = Masters by research 
Study PhD  Is studying part time for PhD 
e  Experience. Years employed in higher education 
e
2  Experience squared 
Break from academe  Has taken career break from academia 
Non-UK HE  Has worked in non-UK HE for more than one year 
Career change  Has changed career to enter academia 
Prof: manager  Occupation prior to HE: Manager or senior official  
Prof: prof  Occupation prior to HE: Professional 
Prof: assoc  Occupation prior to HE: Associate professional 
Prof: admin  Occupation prior to HE: Administrative or secretarial 
Prof: other  Occupation prior to HE: Some other job 
PT  Working part-time 
Non-perm  Not on permanent contract 
End of contract  Months to end of contract (fixed-term contracts only) 
  29Variable Description 
Staff-type (baseline = teaching staff) 
Researcher-only  Staff type = researcher only 
Lecturer/researcher  Staff type = lecturer and researcher 
GProf  Grade = Professor or head of department 
GSLect  Grade = lecturer 
htotal  Total hours worked 
hresearch  Hours spent on research 
hadmin  Hours spent on administration 
RAE lowers sat  RAE lowers satisfaction a lot 
QAA lowers sat  QAA lowers satisfaction a lot 
Policy lowers sat  The general direction of higher education policy lowers 
satisfaction a lot 
Teach no  Would prefer to spend no time teaching 
Research all  Would prefer to spend all time on research 
Admin no  Would prefer to spend no time on administration 
Workload to high  Consider total workload to be very much too high 
Not fair  Find decisions on either individual pay, recruitment to senior posts 
or promotion at current university not at all fair 
RAE 5
*  Department rated 5* in last RAE exercise 
RAE 5  Department rated 5 in last RAE exercise 




5.2  Results 
The results of estimating our ordered probit model of the likelihood of leaving 
UK higher education are presented in Table 10. We estimate four specifications of the 
model. Because of the large numbers who do not report w*, the first specification 
includes a dummy variable for these non-reporters (No w*) and the second excludes 
these. The goodness-of-fit statistic suggests that the latter is marginally a better fit to 
the data. The third specification replaces the w and w* with the second principal 
component factor from the satisfaction analysis – satisfaction with pecuniary factors 
(salary and total earnings). The fit of this equation is slightly lower than the first two 
specifications. Finally, because of the co-linearity between w and w* discussed below, 
we include a further specification with the difference between current and expected 
alternative salary, w-w*. 
  30The effect of both current earnings (w) and expected non-HE earnings (w*) on 
the likelihood of leaving UK HE is negative, with the latter is slightly smaller than the 
former. One reason for this result is that it is due to the high degree of co-linearity 
between the two terms – individuals who earn more in UK academia expect to earn 
more outside of UK academia
22. Because of this, in the final column of Table 10 we 
report the results of a specification with the difference between current and expected 
earnings w–w*. This term is almost always negative
23, implying that most academic 
staff feel they can earn more outside of UK academia. The sign on coefficient on the 
wage difference variable is positive, implying that the likelihood of leaving UK 
academia falls the greater current earnings are relative to expected earnings, the 
coefficient is, however, not significant. When w and w* are replaced with the 
satisfaction with earnings factor (factor 2), this is found to be negatively related to the 
likelihood of leaving – i.e. the more satisfied an academic is with their earnings, the 
less likely they are to leave. 
Turning to the other satisfaction factors, the first factor – satisfaction with non-
pecuniary elements of the current job – has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the likelihood of leaving UK HE. Thus the more satisfied academics are 
with the elements of their job such as the actual work itself, relations with managers 
and colleagues and hours, the less likely they are to leave the sector. This is not true 
for the third factor – longer term prospects. The effect of this on academics propensity 
to leave the UK HE appears to be positive – that is, the likelihood of their leaving 
actually increases with their satisfaction with their longer-term prospects – although 
the statistical significance of the term is not robust to specification. This result may be 
because what is important is factors such as the permanency of academics’ jobs and 
the amount a fixed-term contract remaining for non-permanent staff that are the 
important influences on the likelihood of leaving the sector; both terms are 
statistically significant and of the expected sign (see below). 
In periods of staff shortages, it is common to look abroad for solutions. What 
implication does this have for the future supply of academics in the UK? Do foreign 
academics remain? Our results are unambiguous: Academics from other EU (and 
                                                 
22 A regression of w* on w yields a coefficient on w of 1.03 and an R2 of 0.999. 
23 it is only positive for ten percent of those for whom it can be calculated 
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than UK (and other foreign) academics. Our results support the hypothesis that these 
staff enter academic employment in the UK after completing a higher degree in the 
UK, but ultimately intend to return to their home country. If this is the case, such staff 
will only represent a short-term solution for lower-level jobs in UK higher education 
unless they can be persuaded to remain in the UK. 
Previous work on employee turnover suggests that the likelihood to leave jobs 
generally and possibly UK HE in particular would decline with tenure (see Farber, 
1999; Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). Our results support this hypothesis, with the 
likelihood of leaving UK HE falling with experience, although doing so at a 
decreasing rate. The effect of experience on quits remains declines for the first 
thirteen to seventeen years, depending on the specification, and remains negative until 
experience hits the mid to late twenties.  
There is evidence that individuals who have had a break in their academic 
career are more likely to leave again, suggesting that these staff are indeed more 
peripatetic in nature. This may be because of the individuals’ preferences themselves 
or because they work in an area where there is more flow backwards and forwards 
between academia and the rest of the economy. There is little evidence that those who 
have previous experience of working in other countries’ HE systems are less likely to 
leave, ceteris paribus, although note that it relates to UK academics; the combined 
effect of being from another EU or EEA country, Australia, New Zealand or the US 
and having worked in a foreign HE institution on the likelihood of leaving UK HE is 
still positive. 
Although the effect of the ‘longer term prospects’ factor on the likelihood of 
leaving UK academia appeared counter-intuitive, the permanency of academics 
contracts and the contract time remaining were. Staff on non-permanent contracts are 
significantly more likely to leave UK HE than their colleagues on permanent ones. 
Furthermore, as the end of a fixed time contract approaches, there more likely an 
academic is to leave. The negative significant coefficient on End of contract implies 
that the greater the amount of time left a contract has to run, the less likely the 
individual is to leave UK HE. 
  32Academics who work longer hours are more likely to leave UK HE, although 
the statistical significance of this varies across specifications. This is less true for 
hours of research than hours spent on teaching or admin. Note that this effect on 
leaving is over and above their influence on job satisfaction. 
When we consider the aspects of academic employment that staff feel is 
important for their satisfaction, we find that few of them appear to affect their 
likelihood of leaving. Those who say that the RAE, the QAA and the general direction 
of higher education policy lowers their satisfaction by a lot are no more likely to leave 
UK HE than those who do not. The exceptions to this are those who feel that their 
workload is too high and those who feel that decisions on either individual pay, 
recruitment to senior posts or promotion at their current university not at all fair, who 
are both more likely to leave UK higher education.  
There is evidence that the likelihood of leaving UK higher education is higher in 
the areas with strongest competition from outside academia. The likelihood of leaving 
is highest among staff working in other (non-engineering) technology and medicine 
and dentistry. It is lowest in English literature and other humanities. 
There is little difference in the likelihood of leaving UK academia when one 
compares staff across institutions, ceteris paribus, although staff in two of the new 
universities, one northern and one southern feel that they are more likely to leave. 
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  full  reduced  wage dif  wage sat 
-0.297
* -0.307
** -1.446  -0.148
***  w 
(0.155) (0.155) (0.882)  (0.054) 
-0.221
** -0.226
***     w* 
(0.086) (0.087)    
  0.123    w – w* 
  (0.083)   
-2.497
***       No w* 





***  S1 
(0.326) (0.323) (0.325)  (0.325) 
    -1.218
**  S2 
    (0.505) 
0.711 0.591 0.843
* 1.029
**  S3 





***  Age 55+ 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065)  (0.065) 
-0.242 -0.164 -0.269  -0.344
*  Non-white 
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203)  (0.204) 
0.356 0.270 0.431  0.413  Female 
(0.272) (0.270) (0.270)  (0.271) 
0.126 0.119 0.140  0.127  Married 
(0.099) (0.098) (0.098)  (0.099) 
-0.257 -0.224 -0.289
* -0.222  Female×married 
(0.159) (0.158) (0.158)  (0.162) 
-0.090 0.116  -0.101  0.112
*  Children 
(0.064) (0.144) (0.063)  (0.064) 
-0.107 -0.155 -0.125  -0.109  Female× Children 
(0.089) (0.257) (0.089)  (0.089) 
-0.078 0.069  -0.061  -0.058  Num children 
(0.116) (0.063) (0.116)  (0.116) 
-0.253 -0.077 -0.307  -0.188  Female× 





***  EU Pass 





***  OZNZ 
(0.246) (0.245) (0.242)  (0.245) 
0.401
* 0.363  0.408
* 0.382
*  USA 
(0.231) (0.232) (0.231)  (0.231) 
-0.119 -0.087 -0.117  -0.119  Foreign 
(0.118) (0.120) (0.117)  (0.117) 
0.111 0.136 0.132  0.104  HQ UG 
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091)  (0.091) 
0.173 0.197 0.191  0.165  HQ Masters T 





**  HQ Masters R 
(0.074) (0.075) (0.074)  (0.074) 
-0.142 -0.163
* -0.124  -0.134  Study PhD 





**  e 





**  e 
2 





***  Break from academe 
(0.090) (0.090) (0.089)  (0.089) 
  34  full  reduced  wage dif  wage sat 
-0.172 -0.220 -0.142  -0.162  Non-UK HE 
(0.275) (0.271) (0.272)  (0.272) 
-0.029 -0.025 -0.036  -0.035  Career change 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066)  (0.066) 
0.001 -0.000  -0.004  -0.008  Prof: manager 





**  Prof: prof 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074)  (0.074) 
0.034 0.044 0.046  0.042  Prof: assoc 
(0.105) (0.105) (0.104)  (0.104) 
-0.134 -0.143 -0.105  -0.105  Prof: admin 
(0.150) (0.152) (0.150)  (0.151) 
0.105 0.118 0.117  0.117  Prof: other 
(0.098) (0.097) (0.097)  (0.097) 
-0.169 -0.193 0.034  -0.190  PT 





***  Non-perm 





***  End of contract 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
0.134 0.167
* 0.159  0.155  Researcher-only 





**  Lecturer/researcher 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.084)  (0.083) 
-0.454 -0.348 -0.769
* -0.495  GProf 
(0.469) (0.464) (0.452)  (0.470) 
-0.384 -0.323 -0.508
* -0.440  GSLect 
(0.275) (0.273) (0.271)  (0.273) 
0.541
*** 0.450
** 0.318  0.304  htotal 
(0.200) (0.220) (0.200)  (0.213) 
-0.185
*** -0.094  -0.210
*** -0.053  hresearch 
(0.070) (0.078) (0.071)  (0.076) 
0.277
* 0.098  0.195  -0.017  hadmin 
(0.144) (0.155) (0.141)  (0.150) 
0.063 -0.060  0.033  0.056  RAE lowers sat 
(0.166) (0.081) (0.168)  (0.166) 
-0.157 -0.128 -0.142  -0.148  QAA lowers sat 
(0.324) (0.110) (0.326)  (0.328) 
0.000 -0.128
* 0.007  -0.006  Policy lowers sat 
(0.151) (0.068) (0.152)  (0.151) 
0.086 0.121 0.076  0.098  Teach no 
(0.160) (0.077) (0.158)  (0.159) 
-0.225
* 0.084  -0.222
* -0.226
*  Research all 
(0.135) (0.055) (0.135)  (0.135) 
0.152 0.034 0.155  0.148  Admin no 





***  Workload to high 





***  Not fair 
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055)  (0.055) 
0.049 0.043 0.043  -0.023  RAE 5* 
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115)  (0.117) 
-0.005 -0.008 -0.016  -0.096  RAE 5 





***  RAE 4 
(0.100) (0.101) (0.100)  (0.101) 
  35  full  reduced  wage dif  wage sat 
-0.006 -0.011 0.007  -0.009  norae 





*  Medicine and 
dentistry  (0.162) (0.162) (0.162)  (0.166) 
0.004 -0.028  0.049  0.018  Biological sciences 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.117)  (0.118) 
-0.084 -0.089 -0.098  -0.215  Agriculture and 
related subjects  (0.205) (0.208) (0.200)  (0.208) 
0.474
* 0.408  0.559
** 0.640
**  Physical sciences 
(0.253) (0.252) (0.252)  (0.251) 
0.229 0.195 0.269
* 0.292
*  Mathematical 
sciences  (0.164) (0.163) (0.163)  (0.164) 
0.126 0.098 0.150  0.237
*  Computing sciences 
(0.129) (0.130) (0.129)  (0.134) 
0.055 0.067 0.058  0.068  Engineering 





***  Other technology 
(0.403) (0.399) (0.398)  (0.405) 
-0.480 -0.446 -0.463  -0.541
*  Architecture and 





**  Social studies 
(0.192) (0.191) (0.192)  (0.192) 
-0.118 -0.116 -0.129  -0.181  Business and admin. 
studies  (0.143) (0.141) (0.142)  (0.144) 
-0.812 -0.851 -0.851  -0.783  Librarianship & info. 





**  English lit. And 
classics  (0.193) (0.189) (0.192)  (0.192) 
0.086 0.020 0.199  0.135  Modern languages 





**  Other humanities 
(0.185) (0.183) (0.185)  (0.186) 
-0.392 -0.405 -0.351  -0.461
*  Art and design 





***  Education 
(0.135) (0.134) (0.134)  (0.136) 
0.340 0.288 0.405
* 0.425
*  Combined studies 
(0.246) (0.243) (0.244)  (0.244) 
0.352
* 0.308  0.380
* 0.304  Old Sth uni 1 
(0.194) (0.193) (0.194)  (0.196) 
0.038 0.026 0.020  0.122  New Sth uni 1 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.156)  (0.164) 
-0.117 -0.140 -0.132  -0.147  New Lon uni 
(0.126) (0.127) (0.127)  (0.126) 
0.068 0.033 0.075  0.077  New Sth uni 2 
(0.120) (0.119) (0.120)  (0.120) 
0.262 0.228 0.255  0.206  Old Lon uni 





**  New Nth uni 





*  New Sth uni 3 
(0.209) (0.208) (0.208)  (0.210) 
-0.088 -0.099 -0.091  -0.107  Old Nth uni 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.083)  (0.084) 
New Nth uni 2  -0.088 -0.124 -0.029  -0.041 
  36  full  reduced  wage dif  wage sat 





***  τ1 





***  τ2 
(1.787) (1.793) (0.700)  (0.824) 
-5.951
*** -6.007
*** -0.718  -1.777
**  τ3 
(1.787) (1.793) (0.700)  (0.824) 
-5.380
*** -5.437
*** -0.149  -1.208  τ4 
(1.788) (1.793) (0.701)  (0.825) 
-4.837
*** -4.893
*** 0.392  -0.667  τ5 
(1.787) (1.793) (0.700)  (0.825) 
-4.539
** -4.594
** 0.688  -0.370  τ6 
(1.787) (1.793) (0.703)  (0.827) 
Observations 2312  2312  2312  2312 
LL -3699.2  -3692.9  -3705.0  -3703.0 
M&Z R
2 0.195  0.200  0.190  0.192 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
6  Conclusion 
We have analysed the determinants of satisfaction of academic staff with a 
number of elements of satisfaction. Our results support the finding of Ward and 
Sloane (2000) that there is no significant difference in the job satisfaction of male and 
female academics. Satisfaction with the non pecuniary aspects of the academic job 
tends to decrease with seniority in the early years of careers, but increase later on. 
This relationship does not hold for the salary or total earnings of academics. 
Professors, and to a lesser extent senior lecturers, are on the whole happier in their 
jobs than lower grades. Staff on non-permanent contracts are significantly less 
satisfied with a number of elements of their job, although not their earnings. This 
result provides an explanation for reports that staff on fixed contracts are hard to 
retain and may even be leaving the sector altogether (Bett, 1999). 
 The results of our factor analysis suggest that one would be wrong to consider 
one single measure of job-satisfaction. Academics appear to be considering three 
separate sets of elements of their jobs, namely the pecuniary factors (both the salary 
and the ability to earn money from additional work. 
We also investigated the effects of satisfaction on academic staff’s reported 
intentions to leave UK higher education. We found that dissatisfaction with both the 
  37pecuniary and the non-pecuniary elements of the job does indeed increase the 
likelihood of leaving. The effect of satisfaction with longer term prospects is 
ambiguous, and possibly positive.  
Academics from other EU (and EEA) countries, Australia, New Zealand and the 
US are more likely to leave UK HE than UK (and other foreign) academics. Our 
results support the hypothesis that these staff enter academic employment in the UK 
after completing a higher degree in the UK, but ultimately intend to return to their 
home country. If this is the case, such staff will only represent a short-term solution 
for lower-level jobs in UK higher education unless they can be persuaded to remain in 
the UK. 
As one would expect, the likelihood of leaving UK HE falling with experience, 
although doing so at a decreasing rate. The effect of experience on quits declines for 
the first thirteen to seventeen years, depending on the specification, and remains 
negative until experience hits the mid to late twenties. 
Individuals who have had a break in their academic career are more likely to 
leave again, suggesting that these staff are indeed more peripatetic in nature. This may 
be because of the individuals’ preferences themselves or because they work in an area 
where there is more flow backwards and forwards between academia and the rest of 
the economy. It would be useful to investigate further the causes for greater 
movement. Staff on non-permanent contracts are significantly more likely to leave 
UK Higher Education than their colleagues on permanent ones. Furthermore, as the 
end of a fixed time contract approaches, there more likely an academic is to leave.  
Academics who work longer hours are more likely to leave UK Higher 
Education, although the statistical significance of this varies across specifications, an 
effect that is over and above their direct influence on job satisfaction. This is less true 
for hours of research than hours spent on teaching or admin. Those who feel that their 
workload is too high and those who feel that decisions on either individual pay, 
recruitment to senior posts or promotion at their current university not at all fair, who 
are both more likely to leave UK higher education. There is some evidence that the 
likelihood of leaving UK Higher Education is higher in the areas with strongest 
competition from outside academia. The likelihood of leaving is highest among staff 
  38working in other (non-engineering) technology and medicine and dentistry. It is 
lowest in English literature and other humanities. 
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